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A Postscript On The Japanese-American
"Immigration" Dispute, 1868-1924:
A Diplomatic Tinderbox
T. C. Rhee

[The United States] is a noble land ... that can feed and clothe the
world; . .. a land set like a sentinel between the two imperial oceans .. .
a greater England with a nobler destiny ...
· . . Shall the American people continue their march toward the commercial supremacy ... [and strive for] the empire of our principles ... over
the hearts of all mankind?
· .. Has God endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts and marked us as
people of His particular favor, merely to rot in our own selfishness ... ?
· .. And shall we reap the reward that waits on our discharge of our high
duty; shall we occupy new markets . . . aye, and please God, new markets
for [our ships]?
Hawaii is ours; Porto Rico is to be ours; at the prayer of her people Cuba
... will be ours; in the islands of the East, even to the gates of Asia, coaling stations are to be ours at the very least ... . We cannot retreat from any
soil where Providence has unfurled our banner ....
Senator Albert J. Beveridge!
Our Imperial Land came into existence at the very beginning of the
earth and it is the root and basis of all other countries of the world. Thus ,
if the root is attended to with proper care, the entire world will become
its prefectures and counties, and the heads and rulers of the various
countries will all become its ministers and servants ... [To] make clear
the divine teaching of production and procreation and thereby to set the
peoples of the entire world at peace was, from the very beginning, the
principal and urgent mission of our heavenly country ....
Sato Nobuhiro's "Confidential
Plan of World Unification."2
Scanning the long catalogue of disputes between the Empire of Japan and the
United States in the twentieth century, one is struck by the enormous complexity
and feels a helpless sense of "inevitability" of the Pacific War between the two.
Of many complex and sensitive disputes, the controversy over the Japanese "immigration" to America certainly had high explosive quality and helped exacerbate
the ill feelings between the two most ambitious Pacific powers. Given the series
of clashes covering a myriad of areas, of which the China question was central,
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from 1900 to 1924, it is almost natural that the immigration issue' was hopelessly
entangled in a web of emotion and racial sensitivity barring a peaceful settlement.
Without doubt, the immigration problem, similar to the economic rivalry and
trade problems of the 1970's, was not the core of the differences, but merely a
symptom of greater cleavages separating the two, However, the marginality notwithstanding, the general climate of the time, further aggravated by radical philosophies on both sides-especially on the part of Japan-had gradually propelled
the problem to the very forefront of conflicts. This paper's primary objective is to
examine the dispute within the general context of Japanese-American relations.

Was the historic conflict from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima and Nagasaki inevitable
or avoidable, within the general framework of Japanese-American relations? Admittedly, history is "an argument without end". However, a degree of "inevitability"
was evident as the irony of history propelled the two extraordinarily ambitious
powers to the positions of Great Power at about the same time. In parallel to their
ascendency, major changes in European power alignment would soon place the two
on a collision course. The decline of the Russian Empire as a factor in the Far
Eastern power balance, the British preoccupation with the German challenge, the
Balkan problems and the complications along the North African littoral regions
had incapacitated the European powers' stabilizing influence in Asia.
For Japan, the road to modernization was both exciting and frenetic : Commodore
Perry's Kanagawa Treaty, the Townsend Harris Treaty, the fall of the Tokugawas
and the Meiji Restoration, the rapid pace of industrialization, the sweeping wind
of Western influences in every aspect, the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution,
the realization of full sovel'eign equality, the startling victory over China, the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the epochal defeat of the Russians and the final embarkation on the road to a continental empire.
Although far less spectacular, the arrival of the United States in the AsianPacific arena was not without its major impact. Since the trans-Pacific sailing of
the first American clipper "Empress of China" in 1784, the Asian land mass held
more than a passing attraction for the United States. It was the beginning of
America 's long romance with Asia. 3 After the Monroe Doctrine and its continued
evolution, the aroused passions over "enslaved" Cuba, the Spanish-American War,
and the annexations of Hawaii and the Philippines, Secretary of State John Hay's
Open Door Notes on China were not out of the ordinary, nor were the ambitions
of the "American Imperialists of 1898".
II

The advent of the age of Imperialism in Asia, the frenzied scramble for spheres
of influence in China after the Shimonoseki Peace Conference (1895), and Russia's
lease-hold on Liaotung had soon produced two interesting results: the RussoJapanese conflict and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the former, the United States
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sensed the growing threat to the Open Door principles, while in the latter a comforting support. Japan's devastating victory over Russia had completely changed
American assessment. First, although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was originally
intended to bolster their mutual international position, the Russian defeat had
changed the basic nature of the document and resulted in further Japanese expansion-inimical both to Britain and the United States. Second, the Alliance signified
for the duration of its existence (renewed in 1905 and 1911) the .declining British
capabilities in Asia and the rising Japanese predominance on the continent, which
naturally meant after 1905 the intensified confrontation with America. 4
Indeed, Japan's assertive policies since the Sino-Japanese War had already
posed difficulties for the American concept of Open Door, and to a growing extent
for the Philippines as well. 5 Washington's appreciation of the detrimental effect
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to its general Asian posture was demonstrably
shown in the successive administrations' efforts to negotiate arbitration treaties
with Britain. 6 Besides, Theodore Roosevelt's mediatory efforts during the Portsmouth Conference (1905) largely on behalf of Russia, and the conclusion of the
Taft-Katsura Agreement (1905) concerning Korea and the Philippines undoubtedly
denoted the serious collision of the divergent interests of Japan and the United
States. 7
When in July, 1905, W. W. Rockhill, the chief architect of the Open Door Policy
and now Minister to China, pointed out to Roosevelt the growing seriousness of
the China situation, the President countered by stressing the serious consequences
to be expected in the rapid deterioration of relations with Tokyo. Already, the
deeply embittered Japanese national feelings against the United States over the
peace conference with Russia were further disturbed by the problems of Japanese
immigration, particularly in California. Temporary settlement was attempted
through the Gentlemen's Agreement (1907-8) and the Root-Takahira Agreement
(1908). but the "lingering poison" of the immigration issues rendered any basic
reconciliation difficult. Furthermore, Roosevelt's long held fears of the "Yellow
Peril"-nurtured by the German Kaiser-finally focused the President's attention
"on the new colossus of the Orient."8
Between 1905 and 1907, Japanese-American relations, despite the temporary
relief of various agreements, had so deteriorated that talks of possible war with
Japan became a major obsession of the United States. In the summer of 1907, President Roosevelt cabled General Leonard Wood in secret code to prepare the American forces in the Philippines, then under his command, for the impending Japanese
attack. In July, Roosevelt again confided to his Secretary of State Root that the
general European judgment was that the United States "shall be beaten" in case of
a war with the Japanese. 9
It was in this context of rising crisis that one has to view the American attitude
and policies toward Japanese activities in Manchuria and its adjoining regions.
Japan's imperial designs on China and especially in Manchuria became evident
early as numerous individuals and secret societies of extreme nationalism actively
sought to extend Japan's control over the region. Radical nationalists such as
Toyama Mitsuru, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Kita Jkki, Kotoku Shusui and the band of
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"continental ronins" (i.e., Miyazaki Torazo) had conducted highly suspicious activities in and around China. Mori Kaku, another political intriguer of great notoriety,
envisioned himself as Japan's Clive in China. The activities of Uchida Ryohei's
Black Dragon Society in Manchuria and in Mongolia, particularly active espionage
moves in Siberia all pointed to Japan's expanding ambitions in East Asia. Moreover, Toyama Mitsuru's Genyosha, another ultranationalistic expansionist society
with links to high places in Tokyo government, played an increasingly important
role in the Japanese machinations in Manchuria and its adjacent areas. 10
That these extensive and provocative activities on the part of Japan, so immediately subversive to America's Open Door principles and against the basic spirit
of the bilateral agreements with the United States (i.e., Root-Takahira Agreement),
evoked the first major counter-thrust of the United States was not strange.
The episodic pursuit and failure of the Dollar Diplomacy (and the Neutralization
Plan) during the Taft administration (with the active support of Philander Knox,
Willard Straight, and E. H. Harriman) were further caused by the emerging realignment of the Great Powers in 'East Asia-so pointedly damaging to the Open Door.
Indeed, the extremely ambiguous nature of the treaties in 1907-the JapaneseRussian and the Franco-Japanese-concerning Asia had effectively precluded the
United States from the area as an equal contender.
Japan's continental designs during the period (from Portsmouth to the 1910'S)
enjoyed the coincidental blessings of the rapidly changing international diplomatic
scene. First, the elimination of Russia as a major Asian land power, capable of
putting up the most serious challenge to Japan, enabled Tokyo to realize its objectives without further difficulties. Second, the approaching European crises detracted the maritime powers' attention away from Asia, which resulted in the
erosion of their Asian roles and in their valuable concessions to Japan. Third, the
final collapse of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 and the ensuing confusion in China
along with Yuan Shih-Kai's growing dependence on Japanese financial loans had
particularly accelerated Japan's expansion and consolidation. ll Finally, the First
World War and the Entente's growing need of Japan's assistance virtually sanctioned Tokyo's singlehanded control of China. Undoubtedly, the major victim of
these developments was the Japanese-American relations.
The advent of the Wilson Administration with its high moral tone and the heavy
burden of poisonous legacy of growing antagonism with Japan would set a new
precedent in containing Japan's moves on the continent. War in Europe had sharpened American responsibility in Asia-by destroying the Far Eastern balance of
power and thrusting the United States to the foreground of power interplay. Despite
the obvious ineffectiveness of the singlehanded resistance , Wilson's policy of deterrence was necessitated by three basic factors: 1) the strong precedents from the
previous administrations; 2) the President's new moral concept that "the United
States must help to preserve the territorial integrity not only of China but of all
independent states"; and 3) the impact on American policy by events in China and
through Britain's relations with Tokyo.12
Of particular importance to Wilson's response to Japan, the Japanese immigration
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in California had already taken a dangerous, even explosive nature, and the Magdalena Bay imbroglio was turned into the "Lodge Corollary"-specifically aimed
at Japan's possible or imagined machinations in the Western Hemisphere.13 Besides,
the hassle over the Great Powers' financial consortium in China pointed to Wilson's
increasing apprehension over Japan's basic motives in the Far East.
Within this context, the opening round of the First World War would soon
entangle the United States and Japan in an escalating power conflict. A series of
diplomatic efforts to defuse the possible collision, including a plan to neutralize
sizable portions of the western Pacific and the coastal regions of China, had failed
to produce any constructive result. 14 Japan's rapid invocation of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, to Britain's discomfort, and the military occupation of Shantung (Kiaochow and the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway) would soon evoke the sternest American
response. This blatant violation of Chinese sovereignty in 1914 was closely followed
by the subsequent Twenty-One Demands in 1915, a document tantamount to an
outright colonization of China.15
What eventually forced America's reaction was not the nature of Japan's actions,
which were rather expected, but the intensity and abruptness of demands, which
could have destroyed what was left of China's precarious sovereignty in one stroke.
Moreover, it was evident to Wilson that such an achievement by Japan without a
protest from the United States, effective or otherwise, could permanently destroy
the very basis of America's entire structure of Far Eastern policy. Secretary of
State William Jennings Bryan noted, when he finally analyzed the full text of the
Demands, that the United States did not "cavil at the Japanese contention that
continuity creates special rights and privileges," but rather disputed Japan's contention that those rights included Japanese control of the Chinese political institutions themselves. 16
The final outcome .of the controversy surrounding Japanese aggressions in China
was Bryan's Note of protest filed in 1915-the strongest document ever to be
handed to Japan to date. Bryan stated in part: "[The United States] cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be
entered into between [Japan and China], impairing ... the political or territorial
integrity of [China], or the international policy ... commonly known as the Open
Door policy."17
By 1917, the climax of Japanese-American hostility had been reached. As soon
as Wilson's preoccupation with the German question was over, he undertook four
major responses to Japan in the first concerted American attempt to curb Japan's
expansionism on the continent. First, concerted effort was made to control and limit
debilitating Japanese capital investment in China through the cooperative ordinances of the new four-power consortium. Second, it was decided to take part in
the Siberian military intervention to prevent Japan from detaching the Russian
Maritime Provinces-a move similar in concept to Roosevelt's interventions in the
Portsmouth Conference. Third, Japan was urged repeatedly to restore Shantung
province to China. Fourth, Wilson envisioned the task of codifying the principles
of the Open Door along with his concept of collective security covering the status
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quo of East Asia and the Pacific region. ls
However, such extensive diplomatic undertakings required encompassing preparations and most of all Japan's cooperation. To be sure, following the Bryan Note,
the United States made a series of basic concessions to Japan in order to harmonize
the severely strained relations by agreeing to the formula of Secretary of State
Lansing and Viscount Ishii, Japan's special ambassador,19 However, the minor
achievement of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (1917) proved woefully inadequate in
the face of mounting crises: the Siberian Intervention;20 a series of conflicts during
the Versailles Conference (on Shantung, Siberia, German islands in the Pacific,
Yap, "racial equality" resolution, etc.); the naval race; renewed anti-Japanese legislations in the United States.
It is in this framework of intensifying hostility between the two nations that
one has to review the "immigration" crises of the 1920's-the events culminating
in completely erasing the "Spirit of the Washington Conference" which was viewed
in 1922 as a successful detente in the Pacific region.
III

Despite Commodore Perry's Kanagawa Treaty with the Shogunate in 1854, which
opened Japan's doors to the West, Tokyo 's official sanction for emigration of its
subjects did not come until 1885. But even then the governmental authorization
specifically stipulated that the loss of Japanese nationality did not nullify the basic
obligations of allegiance to the Emperor. Only in 1916 did Japan finally enact the
Expatriation Act, which provided the loss of Japanese nationality with conditions:
1) fulfilment of military service if over seventeen years of age; and 2) application
for the loss of Japanese nationality through the Foreign Office.
Under these changes, a substantial number of Japanese migrated to the United
States during the period of 1870 to 1920.21 During the same period, while the rate
of Chinese immigration had dropped significantly through various restrictive measures (Le., the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act) ,22 the Japanese population increase in
the United States, particularly in the decade of 1910-1920 (when the Gentlemen's
Agreement was in effect)23 was registered at an astounding 54 % .24
What further compounded the public alarm generated in the United States and
particularly along the West coast by this influx was the Hawaiian situation. The
presence of a vast number of Japanese residents in Hawaii prior to the American
annexation gave rise to the specter of rocketing Japanese migrations from Hawaii
to the Pacific coast. This transfer of population after the annexation was not in the
same category as that from Japan proper, and hence almost impossible to control.
Historically, the Hawaiian situation was created by the American sugar planters
on the island kingdom before the annexation. The first importation of Japanese
laborers for the plantations occurred in 1868-numbering less than fifty. However,
between the 1860's and the 1890's, the mistreatment of the Japanese in Hawaii soon
aroused Tokyo's indignation and racial sensitivity and the flow had been discontinued on numerous occasions only to be renewed under urgent requests for man-
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power from the Hawaiian royal government goaded by the American planters. The
continuation of emigration was maintained during this period through a series of
labor conventions between Japan and the Hawaiian Kingdom.
The annexation of Hawaii, however, soon terminated all these labor conventions
as well as the contract-labor system. The inevitable result was the mass exodus of
Japanese laborers to the mainland under normal restrictions of immigration, where
the conditions of employment were deemed much more favorable . Under this
massive influx of immigrants both to Hawaii and the West coast, under conditions
eventually detrimental to Japanese-American relations, the first signs of antiJapanese agitations began to erupt around the turn of the century.25
. The rising tide of ill feelings against the Japanese as a result of the Hawaiian
situation did not abate even after the conclusion of the Gentlemen's Agreement
of 1907 and 1908. 26 Several factors accounted for the continuation and even the
intensification of such hostility. First, it was generally understood that the Agreement was intended to apply only to the mainland and did not specify Hawaii as a
territory coming under this compact Furthermore, the exclusion of Hawaii from
the purviews of this agreement was also in the interests of the Hawaiian planters
whose needs of labor manpower still required the Japanese migration. Second, for
the immigrant residents in Hawaii the migration to the West coast did not involve
legal complications, showing the inadequacy of the provisions. Third, the allowance
for the "picture brides" in the Agreement had led to the influx of "an indefinite
number" which tended to nullify the total effect on limiting the migration, and
obvious intent on the part of the United States. 27
The anti-Japanese and -Oriental agitation took the sharpest tone in California
under the potential specter of eventual "Hawaiianization" of the entire Pacific
coast-involving chiefly California, Oregon, and Washington states, and ultimately
spreading to regions in Utah, Idaho and Montana as well.28 Indeed, the figures
showed that starting from around 1890 "over a thousand Japanese" entered the
United States annually and by the end of the decade the issue of Japanese immigration had already become an extremely sensitive political issue in California and
elsewhere. Politically powerful anti-Japanese agitations broke out and attempts
were made in various states to discriminate against the Japanese and other Orientals
(especially in California schools), and to legislate against Japanese control of the
farm lands.
Powerful national and state organizations-the American Legion, the American
Federation of Labor, the National Grange, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion
League, etc.-demanded at various times to extend the Chinese Exclusion Laws of
the past to the Japanese. As a result of rising animosity towards immigrants and
the numerous incidents heavily charged with racial overtones, the highly sensitive
Japanese government decided in July, 1900 to completely prohibit the immigration
to the United States and Canada. However, this measure proved ineffective largely
because of the Hawaiian situation.
The continuation of the pace of entry of the Japanese in the early 1900's eventually led to massive troubles in San Francisco. The intense anti-Japanese feelings
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at this time were in striking contrast to the earlier American attitude toward Japan.
However, a certain reservoir of American good will and Japan's somewhat friendly
attitude to the United States had suffered a sharp setback ever since the annexations of Hawaii and the Philippines. On both occasions, Japan had expressed keen
"regrets," especially a formal protest on Hawaii as the Japanese had long harbored
ambitions in the colonization of the Pacific islands. 29 The bitter feelings spread
through Roosevelt's interventions during the Portsmouth Conference. The unfortunate coincidence of Japan's rising prominence and ambitions in Asia and the
immigration problems in the United States provided the background for the highly
volatile diplomatic scene.
Prior to 1900, California had already witnessed the wide-spreading labor union
protests against Japan, and in 1898 an American immigration commissioner, W. M.
Rice, was dispatched to Japan to investigate the causes of the growing emigration.
Rice's report to the Commissioner-General of Immigration, which later provided the
rationale for restrictive measures, noted that the Japanese were "tricky, deceitful.
immoral, and un-Christian" and that the Americans had greatly exaggerated Japan's
modernization. 3o Rice further added that the Japanese had "a childlike attachment
to the United States" but without any understanding of the Americans and their
political institutions. Rice's conclusion was that the Japanese were "unassimilable."31
Soon afterward, California's governor and the state legislature resolved to demand that Congress extend the various Alien Exclusion laws to Asians in general
and particularly the Japanese. In early 1905, the San Francisco Chronicle published
a series of anti-Japanese articles and in May the Asiatic Exclusion League was
organized. Congress, under great pressure from members of the West coast states,
debated the exclusion bills-opposed by President Roosevelt for fear of diplomatic
complications with Japan-and failed. Denied recourse from federal statutes, in
October, 1906, the San Francisco School Board passed a resolution barring Japanese
children from public schools and banished them to schools in China town. The
rationale behind this action was that "the presence of adult Japanese in the grades
had a pernicious moral influence upon children."32 However, what really aggravated the matter were the tragic consequences of the San Francisco earthquake in
1906, which resulted in numerous incidents of anti-Japanese violence. 33
The dangerous aspect of this problem was soon revealed when Japan-in the
aftermath of her spectacular victory over Russia-reacted with the strongest protest, hinting the possibility of a major crisis even involving a military showdown.
The Mainichi Shim bun, on October 22 fumed:
Stand up, Japanese nation! Our countrymen have been HUMILIATED on
the other side of the Pacific. Our poor boys and girls have been expelled
from the public schools by the rascals of the United States, cruel and
merciless like demons .. .. Why do we not insist on sending [war]ships?
Although, by and large, Tokyo government's official reaction was more restrained
by accepting the basic American claim of right to unilaterally limit and restrict immigration, its emotional indignation against discrimination was not any less intense.
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Caught between California and Japan, Roosevelt exploded to Senator Hale of
Maine in October 1906:
I do not think that ... [Japan] wishes war as such, and I doubt if she
would go to war now; but I am very sure that if sufficiently irritated and
humiliated by us she will get to accept us instead of Russia as the national
enemy whom she will ultimately have to fight; and under such circumstances her concentration and continuity of purpose, and the exceedingly
formidable character of her army and navy, make it necessary to reckon
very seriously with her.34
In the same vein, he confided to Senator Lodge that "[the] feeling of the Pacific
Coast people . . . is as foolish as if conceived by the mind of a Hottentot" and that
he could not understand how this "careless insolence" and gross insult of the
Japanese could be reconciled with America 's desire for "advantages in Oriental
markets."35
The potential diplomatic explosion was temporarily smoothed by the timely intercessions of the President and Secretary of State Root, who cabled to Tokyo that
"the United States will not for the moment entertain the idea of any treatment of
the [Japanese] other than that accorded to the people of the most friendly European
nations."36 The President also persuaded the California school board to repeal its
resolution with the understanding that Washington would settle the issue directly
with Japan and achieve the result desired by the West Coast. 37
The outcome of this crisis was the negotiation of the Gentlemen's Agreement,
1907-8, and the Root-Takahira Agreement, 1908, by which the Japanese government
agreed to voluntarily withhold passports good for the continental United States
from laborers, skilled or unskilled, and their kin. Although the Hawaiian islands
were not included in the provisions, Tokyo on its own volition chose to enforce the
same rules on the islands. 38
Although this agreement at least temporarily alleviated the mounting tension
between the two nations, several reasons inherent and extraneous to the agreement
kept the immigration crisis alive and explosive. First, the Gentlemen's Agreement
was not in a treaty form to be sanctioned by the Senate and binding on two
parties, but was merely an "executive agreement," whose efficacy depended entirely on the good faith of the parties. Despite the rigorous restrictions placed on
immigration by the Japanese government, the continuing entrance of the "picture
brides" seemed somewhat to nullify the total effect desired by the United States. 39
This would soon lead to the West Coast claim that Japan was not acting in good
faith in implementing the agreement, and kept the crisis unmitigated. Second, the
continued issuance of passports to legitimate non-laborers, although strictly in
accordance with the text of the agreement, was generally judged to be in contravention of the spirit of the accord. 4o Third, the American policy of Dollar Diplomacy
and the Neutralization Plan41 -pursued in parallel to the agreement, and concerning
the financial loans and the railway projects in China- was unmistakably judged
to be solely anti-Japanese in character, and was by no means conducive to friendly
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ties between the two nations.
Indeed, official testimonies 42 to the satisfactory results of the Gentlemen's
Agreement notwithstanding, the Pacific coast did not support the agreement from
the very beginning. Less than a year after the accord, the California legislature
adopted a resolution urging the Congress to formally extend the Chinese Exclusion
laws to the Japanese immigrants. Furthermore, in 1913, shortly after Woodrow Wilson's inauguration, California passed an anti-alien land law, which provided the
aliens ineligible for naturalization "all rights to real property granted by treaty" but
no others, except to lease land for only three years. In the case of the Japanese, this
meant that they were barred from agricultural land ownership and could not in any
way inherit land. 43
The serious nature of this act was that it was eventually sustained not only by
the Supreme Court, but more significantly by the general public opinion although
there were severe criticisms of the measure largely in Eastern and northern United
States. 44 Under this rising consensus, many other states adopted similar legislation
-Arizona, Texas, Washington, etc.
The seriousness of these domestic measures was not in the legislations themselves but could be measured only in the context of the international situation
where the divergent national interests came to clash. It is also difficult to determine
whether or/ and how the two elements of domestic politics and foreign policy were
interrelated in a logically meaningful fashion. However, at least the simultaneity
of the events had come to play an undeniable role in destroying the relations
between Washington and Tokyo. In a sense, the anti-Japanese propaganda in prior
years had been tremendously effective. But much more significant were the
rumored stories of active Japanese spies in the Western Hemisphere and their
machinations over Magdalena Bay. Moreover, Wilson's views, bolstered even more
strongly by William Jennings Bryan and Paul Reinsch (the two most ardent "antiimperialists"), had a direct bearing on American attitude toward Japan's aggressive
policies in China. The rising activities of the ultra-rightwing Japanese societies in
China, Japan's involvement with Yuan Shih-kai's regime and his Peiyang military
clique, growing American apprehensions on Japanese interpretations of the third
Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1911) all contributed to exacerbating America's ill feelings
toward the immigration issue.
Not to mention the Shantung Question, the subsequent Twenty-One Demands
and other ticklish issues of the League Mandate of the former German islands in
the Pacific, and the lurking questions of the Philippine security did all damage the
good relations. The reconciliation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement could not put a
stop to the deterioration. 45 However, one most noteworthy episode in the proGess
of deterioration was the confrontation at the Versailles Peace Conference over
Japan's proposal for racial equality provisions in the League Covenant. Coming at
a time of multiple crises, the United States could not entertain the proposal. Not
only the general temper of the American public opinion on immigration, but the
extremely hard positions of several key British Dominion states (South Africa,
Canada and Australia) made the proposal an exercise in futility.46
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What was particularly vexing to the United States was the immediate possibility, once the racial equality resolution became an integral part of the Covenant,
that the problem of immigration might no longer be considered a matter of domestic
decision but an international problem to come under the jurisdiction of an international body yet untested. This specter of intrusion into American sovereign
rights was one of the major causes of the defeat of Japan's proposal as well as the
Senate's rejection of the entire Versailles package. In fact, in October, 1920, thirty
two Democratic senators and all the other senators of the Pacific and Far Western
states voted for a reservation stating that the United States was not to submit to the
League of Nations on any domestic matters. Needless to say, the squelching of the
Japanese proposal and the reactions in the United States greatly escalated the crisis
atmosphere between Tokyo and Washington. In historical perspective, the two nations would not recover from this fundamental setback.
As a result of intensive anti-Japanese propaganda campaigns in California, after
the Versailles Conference, the state legislature adopted a tougher Alien Land Law
in November, 1920, which was decisively ratified by the popular votes in the
state election. This act, designed to supplement and strengthen the 1913 law, provided: 1) the prohibition of ownership and lease of land by aliens ineligible for
naturalization and the land purchase by American-born children of such aliens
under guardianship ; 2) in the case of aliens' existing land ownership, prior to this
act, removal of their guardianship over their American-born children; 3) the prohibition of purchase of stocks in landholding corporations. Although the law did
not specifically mention the Japanese , both the Japanese government and the
Japanese in California realized its primary intent against them. 47
The dangerous implication of this legislation-soon to be imitated in other states
(Washington, Colorado, Nebraska, Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico)-was to be
noticed in the radicalization of Japan's foreign policy views.48 Japan's brief and
precarious experiment in liberal policies , domestic and foreign, under Hara Kei and
Shidehara Kijuro, two important architects of the Washington agreements and
treaties of 1921-22, would come under violent attacks from the radical elements in
Japan. The subsequent demise of the Liberal Twenties and the rise of the "Imperial
Way Faction" of the army could be in no small measure attributable to the immigration hassles between Japan and the United States. 49
Soon after the California Alien Land Act, the state supreme court declared the
law unconstitutional on the grounds of violations of: 1) the terms of the JapaneseAmerican treaty; 2) the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids a state to abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens; and 3) the article in the California constitution similar in purpose to the Fourteenth Amendment. However, given the
temper of the time, this court decision became so unpopular that in 1923, at a
time when the Congress was debating a new immigration law based on the quota
system, the Federal Supreme Court overturned the decision upholding the Alien
Land Act in toto. 50
However, even this decision could not mollify the popular revulsion in California
against the Japanese and other Oriental immigrants. For some time since the mid-
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1910's, the West coast in general demanded the complete abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement in favor of a total exclusion of undesirable aliens through a
federal statute. This campaign had been strongly managed by various right-wing
organizations such as the American Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the
Golden West, the Hearst papers, Anti-Japanese Leagues of various states, the
California Oriental Exclusion League, etc. The upshot of this agitation was the
introduction of history's most controversial and disastrous bill of immigration in
Congress in 1923-24. 51
The irony of this Congressional debate and the eventual passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 was that it had taken place after one of the most comprehensive
if not totally successful "disarmament" conferences in history, and as such completely eliminated further chances of a rapprochement in the Pacific region.
Indeed, the Washington Conference on Naval Limitation, 1921-22, had resulted in
a series of treaties and agreements covering the multiple areas of conflicts (i.e.,
the China question in general, the Open Door principles, the problems of the Pacific
security and peace, Yap, Siberia, and the Chinese demands on "tariff autonomy"
and the "extraterritorial rights"). The conclusion of the Four, Five and Nine Power
Pacts certainly brought a period of rapprochement amongst the Great Powers and
attained the status of international legal obligation for the principles of the Open
Door. It was undoubtedly a crowning achievement for the Republican Administration of Harding and Charles Evans Hughes, whose party's defeat of the Wilsonian
program had left a political vacuum in the League and in the Pacific. However,
this euphoria was to be short-lived, and with the 1924 Immigration Act came to a
sudden death.52

IV
On March 24, 1924, a House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
reported ("Restriction of Immigration"):
The Supreme Court ... has decided that certain nationals of oriental
countries are not entitled to be naturalized as citizens of the United States
. . . . The Committee feels justified in offering a provision that [such
persons) shall not be admitted as 'immigrants' ....
[The Committee] has been favorably disposed to such a policy for two
years, and careful investigation has strengthened that sentiment . . . . 53
It was this kind of sentiment plus the fact that the debate was singularly aimed at the
Japanese immigrants that had immediately evoked violent reactions from Tokyo.
Jefferson Caffery, the American charge in Tokyo, cabled the State Department on
January 11, 1924, that the Japanese government viewed the Congressional debate
with the utmost seriousness, and relayed Tokyo's warnings to Washington of "grave
consequences".54 Reflecting such emotional reaction, M. Hanihara, the Japanese
ambassador in Washington, delivered a lengthy memorandum to the State Department on January 15, in which he stated ominously that Japan was exercising "the
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utmost forbearance" in the matter, expecting "justice and fair-play" from the
United States. 55
The opposition to the bill, however, was not confined to the Japanese government. As early as in 1921, the American ambassador to Japan, Morris, who originally
defended many of the restrictive immigration laws in the United States, categorically warned Washington that legislations such as California's would undoubtedly arouse a "deep feeling of resentment" in Japan and that such an eruption in
Japan could not be beneficial to American national interest. 56
In 1924, as the Congressional debate gathered momentum, the anxious Executive
branch was increasingly apprehensive of the potential damage to the structure and
integrity of the Washington treaties of 1922. Reflecting this gloom, Secretary of
State Hughes wrote a lengthy letter (February 8, 1924) to Albert Johnson, chairman
of the House committee, pointing out the "practical effects of a bill that singled
out Japanese immigrants for expulsion" on the American national interest in East
Asia. He wrote in part:
The Japanese are a sensitive people, and unquestionably would regard
such a [legislation] as fixing a stigma upon them. I regret to be compelled
to say that I believe such [action] would largely undo the work of the
Washington Conference ... which so greatly improved our relations with
Japan .... The question is thus presented whether it is worth while thus to
affront [Japan] ... and what gain there would be from such action. 57
He defended the wisdom of controlling immigration through the formula of the
Gentlemen's Agreement rather than through a statute, and felt that such a control
would not only have the Japanese cooperation but would also be least damaging
to the general American diplomatic posture.
After a month of inaction, Hughes again entreated the Congress to change its
mind in favor of continuing the Gentlemen's Agreement. However, on March 24,
the House Committee produced its final report on the proposed bill, roundly condemning the efficacy of the Agreement and called for an enactment which would
totally exclude "aliens ineligible to citizenship". The final House vote came on
April 12, 1924, adopting the act with a vote of 323 to 71 (37 not voting).58
In the meantime, as the Japanese opposition mounted, Hughes, mainly at the
House Committee's request, pointedly reminded Japan of her own exclusion of
Chinese and Koreans-a fact even less excusable than the alleged American discrimination of the Japanese as it was against the same race . Hughes also indicated
the not entirely satisfactory record of the Gentlemen's Agreement in leading to
the present predicament. 59
The escalation of the rhetorical exchanges continued without abatement, and
certainly accelerated the tempo of deterioration between the two nations. On April
10, just two days before the House vote, Ambassador Hanihara repeated the veiled
threats aired before in January: "[Speaking frankly at the risk of repeating what
had been already stated], the mere fact that a certain clause, obviously aimed
against Japanese as a nation, is introduced in the [immigration bill], in apparent
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disregard of the most sincere and friendly endeavors [of Japan] is mortifying .... "60
On April 15, Ambassador Woods from Japan cabled Hughes that Japan's public
reaction was taking an ugly turn as the "resentful tone" crept into every major
newspaper article. Woods reported that the most prestigious fiji press, the authoritative mouthpiece of the government, commented with bitterness: "No nation
retaining the least trace of its self-respect could tolerate the discrimination aimed
at by the Johnson bill. The bill strikes at the very foundation of American-Japanese
relations. "61
However, prior to this date sensing the Japanese feelings, Hughes relayed Hanihara's letter (April 10) to Senator Colt, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Immigration, expecting the content of the Japanese ambassador's letter which also
contained the reasoned argument for the Gentlemen's Agreement could calm down
the voices of expulsion in the Senate. But Hughes' judgment was entirely misplaced. Two days after the House vote, Senator Lodge raised the question of Hanihara's letter in the committee debate and charged that its "veiled threats" constituted an unwarranted interference in domestic affairs of the United States. 62 The
final result was the accelerated passage of the bill on April 16 by a vote of 71 to 6.
A series of executive interventions by President Coolidge and Hughes could not
budge the Congress. 63
The impact on Japan was volcanic, as Griswold put it: 64
The thorn did not cease to rankle in Japan's flesh, nor Japan her efforts
to pluck it out. It seems safe to say that the American people have never
resented any policy pursued by Japan in China or elsewhere as deeply,
as unanimously and with as poignant a sense of injustice as the Japanese
have resented the statutory exclusion of 1924.
Indeed, in the final analysis, the problem was not one of morality or guilt, as
Japan's own criminality in Asia will have no match in history, but rather the cold
fact of the statute's impact on the relations between Japan and the United States
in the years that followed.
The exclusion law that the United States and Japan had dreaded for so long
finally became unchangeable reality. Theodore Roosevelt in a letter to Senator
Lodge in 1905 prophetically noted: 65
That Japan will have her head turned to some extent I do not in the
least doubt, and I see clear symptoms of it in many ways. We should
certainly as a nation have ours turned if we had performed such feats as
the Japanese have .... I have no doubt that some Japanese . .. will behave
badly .... Most certainly the Japanese soldiers and sailors have shown
themselves to be terrible foes . There can be none more dangerous in all
the world . ...
The years following the 1924 Act certainly had shown Japan's unmatched menace
to the Far Eastern and world peace, to which the United States could not be
indifferent if for self-interest. The Tanaka Memorial (1927), the invasion of Shantung (1928), the conquest of Manchuria (1931)' the establishment of Manchukuo
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(1932), Japan's withdrawal from the League (1933), the Amau Doctrine (the racially
charged Japanese "Asian Monroe Doctrine") (1934), the China Incident (1937) and
the extraordinary crimes of aggression, Konoye's "New Order" in East Asia (1938)
and Tojo's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the attack on Pearl
Harbor-generously spiced with Japan's domestic reactions, New Japanism of
General Araki and his fanatical "Imperial Way Faction," and the philosophy of
the "Showa Restoration" to cite a mere few! This long list of radical Japanese
policies had come after 1924.
Reviewing the emotional drama of the 1920's, and chronicling the cumulative
problems between Japan and the United States since the 1960's, one is thunderstruck by their remarkable similarity. The problems of the Okinawa reversion, the
mutual security pact, the military bases in Japan, the China question (once again!),
the multifarious trade problems-comparable in emotional reactions to the immigration issues of the 1920's-not to mention the national bitterness over the two
"Bombs" and the rising anti-American feelings in Japan all point to an ominous
re-play of the rupture of ties between these two most important Pacific nations. 66
Commenting on the recent trend in Japanese-American relations, one "Old China
Hand" John Paton Davies wrote: 67
If Washington's reactions to Japan's superior competitiveness come to
be interpreted by Tokyo as threatening to Japan's livelihood, then something like the American-Japanese syndrome of the nineteen-thirties may
well recur in accelerated form. Japan would be alienated from the United
States and, in wounded pride and bitterness, probably turn chauvinist,
build up self-sufficient [military power] including nuclear weapons [and
seek] closer ties with China and even the Soviet Union to counterbalance
[American hostility].
The reverse-Japan's "treachery" and "double-dealing" diplomatic ploys-could
easily lead to America's response in containing the Japanese menace.
Then, looking at the problems of the 1970's, one could ask what is to play the
destructive role of the 1924 Act-Japan's ambiguous position of Taiwan? her approaches to the Soviet Union? Japan's devisive role on the Korean peninsula? her
dalliance with India, North Vietnam and others opposed to the United States?
or finally her expected re-militarization? Japan's disruptive motives behind desires
to establish ties with Peking?
University of Dayton
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